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ABSTRACT 
Learning-in-action, the cyclical interplay of thinking and doing, is increasingly important 
for organizations as environments and required capabilities become more complex and 
interdependent.  Organizational learning involves both a desire to learn and supportive 
structures and mechanisms. We draw upon three case studies from the nuclear power and 
chemical industries to illustrate a four-stage model of organizational learning:  (1) local 
stage of decentralized learning by individuals and work groups, (2) control stage of fixing 
problems and complying with rules, (3) open stage of acknowledgement of doubt and 
motivation to learn, and (4) deep learning stage of skillful inquiry and systemic mental 
models.  These four stages differ on whether learning is primarily single-loop or double-
loop, i.e., whether the organization can surface and challenge the assumptions and mental 
models underlying behavior, and whether learning is relatively improvised or structured.  
The case studies illustrate how organizations learn differently from experience, the details 
of learning practices, and the nature of stage transitions among learning practices. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Learning-in-action, the cyclical interplay of thinking and doing (Argyris & Schön, 1996; 
Daft & Weick, 1984; Kolb, 1984), is increasingly important for organizations as they 
struggle to cope with rapidly changing environments and more complex and 
interdependent sets of knowledge.  We define learning as a change in the likelihood that 
behaviors will be imagined or enacted in specific situations, and organizational learning 
as an analogous change at an organizational level.2  Whereas learning is a process of 
change, the content of that process, the situation-action linkages, is knowledge (broadly 
construed to include explicit information, tacit know-how, etc.).  Organizational 
knowledge is embodied in physical artifacts (equipment, layout, databases, documents), 
organizational structures (roles, reward systems, procedures), and people (skills, values, 
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 This is similar to Argyris & Schön’s (1996) definition of theories of action as propositions of the form “if 
you intend to produce consequence C in situation S, then do [action] A” (p. 13).  We preserve the form of 
these propositions but relax the focus on intentional learning to acknowledge that learning can occur 
without intention or awareness, and even without observable action (Glynn, Lant, & Milliken, 1994).    
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beliefs, practices) (cf., Argote & Ingram, 2000; Levitt & March, 1988; Schein, 1992).  
Enactment or putting this knowledge to use requires combining component-level 
knowledge and filling gaps by improvisation (Weick, 1998).  Enacting more unfamiliar, 
tacit, contextual, or contested knowledge requires more iterative, unpredictable, and 
emergent learning processes (Carlile, in press; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
Consider, for example, a factory producing some amount of product per unit time.  
During a visit to another factory, organization members observe that similar machines 
can be run at higher speeds.  Yet, after returning to their factory, production remains at 
the same rate.  Although individual human beings are naturally programmed to learn, 
organizations are not.  Learning may be inhibited by adherence to traditions or bosses 
who insist, “this is the way we do things around here” (Oliver, 1992; Schein, 1992). Until 
external pressure, a vision, or an intrinsic motive engages new behaviors, there may be no 
measurable change in performance.  If the factory does speed up production in response 
to competition, morale may erode, quality may drop, machines may break down, and the 
factory may ultimately lose its customers.  Learning does not have to be an improvement 
(Crossan, et al., 1995; Repenning & Sterman, 2000; cf. superstitious learning, Levitt & 
March, 1988).  If management decides instead to reorganize the plant into a lean 
production system rather than simply speeding up the machines and the people, then the 
factory would need time to try out unfamiliar actions and coordinate the various 
components to climb a learning curve (Argote, 1999) and avoid a learning failure (e.g., 
Repenning & Sterman, 2000).   
A fundamental issue in organizational learning is how knowledge emerges and 
flows across boundaries: interpersonal, cross-team, cross-function, inter-unit, and inter-
 4
organization (Crosson, Lane, & White, 1999; Kim, 1993; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).  
Bridging across these “thought worlds” (Dougherty, 1992) requires common experiences 
and common referents, which are developed in bridging practices (Carlile, in press; Cook 
& Brown, 1999) including cooperative action, shared representations, collaborative 
reflection, and exchanges of personnel (Gruenfeld, Martorana, & Fan, 2000).  Carroll 
(1998) and Popper & Lipshitz (1998) list organizational learning structures and practices 
such as benchmarking, job rotations, after action review, and databases for knowledge 
management.   Learning is supported by organizational slack (Schulman, 1993) and 
human capital investments in conflict management skills to enable diverse group 
members to work with one another (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999), inquiry skills to 
enhance conversations and surface assumptions (Isaacs, 1999), and systems thinking 
skills to link a wider variety of information into actionable models (Senge, 1990).   
In the course of a decade of research on organizational learning in nuclear power 
plants and chemical plants, we have noticed a pattern in how various plants approach the 
challenges of developing learning capabilities.  We noted apparent long-term effects of 
industry-level phenomena such as disasters (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Bhopal) and 
anticipated deregulation, regulatory pressure for self-improvement (Carroll & 
Hatakenaka, 2001; Jackson, 1996), and corporate-level shifts in policies and resources 
following economic hardship (Marcus & Nichols, 1998).  Many plants were adept at 
incremental learning or adaptations that exploit familiar routines without challenging 
underlying assumptions (“single-loop learning” Argyris & Schon, 1996).  Some plants 
struggled to move beyond “band-aids” and quick fixes toward more effective actions 
based on deeper understanding of systemic causes (Carroll, 1998).  But challenging 
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assumptions and changing mental models (“double-loop learning” Argyris & Schon, 
1996) required unfamiliar analytical and social skills and unusual political support. 
In this paper, we present a stage model of organizational learning and illustrate 
transitions among the stages with three case studies from the nuclear power and chemical 
industries.  Although “high-hazard” industries (Perrow, 1984) such as nuclear power and 
chemicals have special challenges in learning because trial and error is so costly (Weick, 
1987), their efforts to develop learning capabilities are instructive for all organizations.   
 
A STAGE MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Stage models are common in organization theory, for example in descriptions of 
organizational life-cycles (e.g., Quinn & Cameron, 1983) and in historical analyses of 
organizational forms over time (Chandler, 1962; Malone & Smith, 1988; Perrow, 1970).  
The four stages in Figure 1 are presented as a provocative guide to analysis, not as a rigid 
model of development.  In any organization, there will be examples of each stage in 
operation in different parts of the organization and at different moments in time. It is 
healthy for organizations to use multiple learning mechanisms at many organizational 
levels (individual, team, department, and so forth) in order to draw on a wide range of 
capabilities and enable a creative tension between different approaches (Crosson & Hurst, 
2001; Crosson et al., 1999; Weick et al., 1999).  However, the latter stages require shared 
understanding and collaborative effort across the organization, so these capabilities must 
become relatively widespread and commonly enacted if they are to be sustained.   
Although we propose that these stages and capabilities tend to emerge in a particular 
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order, being “at” a stage means that there is relatively more behavior consistent with that 
stage and earlier stages.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 
--------------------------------- 
Local Stage 
In what we label the Local Stage, there is considerable organization-specific and task-
specific knowledge that is contextual (Carlile, in press), tacit (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995), and sticky or hard to transfer (von Hippel, 1994).  Exceptions occur frequently, 
and decisions are made locally by those steeped in the details.  The organization relies on 
technical expertise to cope with surprises and provide flexibility or resilience (Wildavsky, 
1988).  Learning mostly occurs locally and information does not travel easily beyond 
particular workgroups and contexts.  
For example, like most organizations that start and often remain small (Aldrich, 
1999), early nuclear power plants began as small demonstrations of possible designs, 
which were later scaled up for economic efficiency.  Although they were more 
proceduralized than fossil fuel plants, nuclear power plants were similar in drawing 
knowledge from the experiences and skills of craft workers and sharing the attitude of 
“run it ‘til it breaks.”  Design engineers appear to have understood plant construction as a 
finite project to build a production machine.  Once built and debugged, the plants were 
expected simply to run, a belief echoed by nuclear utilities and regulators: 
"Technological enthusiasts heading the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] believed 
most accidents were too unlikely to worry about" (Jasper, 1990, p. 52).  Given this belief, 
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little attention was paid to “minor” problems in a plant or other plants in the industry, 
unless those problems affected production.    
When a combination of minor problems and operators doing what they were 
trained to do produced the Three Mile Island (TMI) event in 1979, this constituted a 
"fundamental surprise" (Lanir, 1986) for the nuclear power industry.  The information 
needed to prevent the TMI event had been available from similar prior incidents at other 
plants, recurrent problems with the same equipment at TMI, and engineers’ critiques that 
operators had been taught to do the wrong thing in particular circumstances, yet nothing 
had been done to incorporate this local information into plant-wide or industry-wide 
operating practices (Marcus, Bromiley, & Nichols, 1989).  In reflecting on TMI, the 
utility’s president Herman Dieckamp said,  
To me that is probably one of the most significant learnings of the whole 
accident [TMI] the degree to which the inadequacies of that experience 
feedback loop... significantly contributed to making us and the plant 
vulnerable to this accident. (Kemeny, et al., 1979, p. 192) 
Control Stage 
Growth in terms of size and complexity is a major driver of formalization (e.g., Pugh et 
al, 1969).  To achieve economies of scale, expertise is organized into workgroups and 
departments that often become classic “silos” of knowledge.  To coordinate efficiently 
among workgroups and other subunits, organizations generate standard operating 
procedures and other formal routines (Nelson & Winter, 1981; Levitt & March, 1988).  
Controls are instituted to encourage uniformity, including accounting controls, procedure 
manuals, training programs, planning processes, and so forth.  Learning is understood as 
 8
a set of routines such as training, performance feedback, and statistical process control 
(Sitkin et al, 1994).  When organizations are forced by repeated failure or stakeholder 
pressure to initiate changes, they may seek to copy success stories (e.g., start a TQM 
program, Cole, 1998) rather than to rethink assumptions and reshape the organization.  
Learning is directed at maintaining control through exploitation of the known rather than 
exploration of the unknown (March, 1991), single-loop evolutionary enhancements rather 
than double-loop revolutionary changes (Argyris & Schön, 1996).  
For most of its history, the nuclear power industry attempted to improve 
operations and prevent accidents through creation and enforcement of bureaucratic 
controls.  The desire for control is compatible with the norms of the engineering 
profession that have shaped many industries such as nuclear power (Rochlin & von 
Meier, 1994).  Elaborate probabilistic analyses were used to anticipate (Wildavsky, 1988) 
all possible failure paths and to design physical and procedural barriers to these paths.  
When problems occurred, investigations typically identified actions that failed to comply 
with the rules, such as operators who did not follow procedures or engineers who made 
erroneous calculations (Carroll, 1995; Reason, 1990).  Problems stimulated blame that 
undermined information flow and learning (Morris & Moore, 2000; O’Reilly, 1978).  
Line managers expected concrete solutions that would strengthen control mechanisms 
(more training, more supervision, more discipline), create more rules (more detailed 
procedures, more regulatory requirements), or design hazards and humans out of the 




Large, conservative, bureaucratic organizations can be highly successful in stable 
environments, but in turbulent and unpredictable environments, they do not learn or 
change fast enough, often ignoring threats (e.g., Cole, 1998; Freeman, 1999).  Working 
harder to achieve consistency and efficiency may preclude “working smarter” for 
fundamental process improvement because such initiatives divert resources away from 
current production (Repenning & Sterman, 2000).  Eventually, increased pressure and 
enlightened employees at various levels may open the organization to self-analysis, 
recognition of uncertainty, elaboration of learning mechanisms, and innovation (Quinn & 
Cameron, 1993).   
In the nuclear power industry, regulators and industry groups have long been 
calling for greater awareness of minor incidents and actions to avoid future trouble 
(Jackson, 1996; Rochlin, 1993).  Today, a typical nuclear power plant may identify over 
2000 problems or incidents per year, 90% of which would have been ignored in the past.  
As Weick & Sutcliffe (2001) state, “to move toward high reliability is to enlarge what 
people monitor, expect, and fear” (p. 91).  Although efforts to accelerate learning may 
include technological initiatives such as web-based information exchanges and databases 
of new ideas and best-practice routines (Pan & Scarbrough, 1998; Davenport & Prusak, 
1997), the open stage is based on attitudes and cultural values of genuine curiosity, 
involvement, sharing, and mutual respect, and a climate of psychological safety 
(Edmondson, 1999). 
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Deep Learning Stage 
The final stage, as we envision it, builds upon the open stage by adding more capability 
for understanding deep, systemic causes and creating a wider range of action possibilities 
to address such causes.  Organizations at this stage are capable not only of mutual respect 
across internal and external boundaries, but also of skillful inquiry and facility to gain 
insights, challenge assumptions, surface existing frames, and create comprehensive 
models (Argyris & Schön, 1996; Senge, 1990). Analyses are based on facts but connect 
logically to systemic, organizational, cultural, and political viewpoints and experience 
with a repertoire of actions that can change these deep structures.   
Deep learning practices are not widespread in the nuclear power and chemical 
industries. Even the best plants struggle with analyzing below the level of equipment 
problems, human error, and procedure inadequacies (Carroll, 1995, 1998, Carroll et al, 
2001).  Despite a desire to improve, investigators and managers seldom look for 
fundamental or deep, systemic causes because they lack ready-made actions to address 
such issues and ways of evaluating their success (remnants of the control stage).  Carroll, 
Sterman, & Marcus (1998) relate one example of an innovative technique that introduced 
such practices to Du Pont chemical plants, based on a system dynamics model turned into 
an interactive game.  In our third case, we present another example that shows how this 
transition requires attention, resources, and discipline.  
 In the remainder of this chapter, we present three case studies of organizations 
that made significant transitions from stage to stage.  Presenting the cases as transitions 
clarifies the differences between stages and illustrates the challenges of changing 
behavior, emotions, and mental models.  It also allows us to emphasize that organizations 
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are now, and may always be, in transition.  Following the case studies, we draw some 
lessons about organizational learning and the stage model. 
 
A SHIFT FROM LOCAL TO CONTROL STAGE 
In the first case study, a nuclear power plant investigated an incident in which an 
employee was seriously hurt. This plant was attempting to improve safety and 
performance in part by using a newly upgraded problem investigation process.  The 
investigation created an opportunity to raise collective awareness about local work 
practices and helped managers strengthen controls and increase conformity to rules. 
Fall from Roof 
An electrical maintenance supervisor sent three men to replace light bulbs inside the 
“hot” machine shop, the area used to decontaminate equipment of radiological residue.  
The men headed off to the work area and discussed among themselves how to reach the 
light bulbs.  They decided that one of them, whom we call Joe, would access the lights by 
climbing on the roof of a shed within the larger building.   Joe and one coworker dressed 
in anti-contamination suits and propped a ladder against the shed wall.  Joe crawled up 
the ladder and onto the roof.   As he was about to reach the lights, one of the roof panels 
gave way, dumping him 10 feet to the ground below.  His injuries included a broken 
scapula, a broken rib, three fractures to the small bones near the spine, a lacerated lung 
and arm.  His coworkers called EMTs who took Joe to the hospital. 
The Plant’s Interpretation 
For an event of this seriousness, a multi-discipline team was assembled to collect 
information, analyze causes, and make recommendations.  The team noted that a number 
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of standard operating procedures regarding safety assessment were not followed.  When 
the electrical supervisor assigned three men to the job, no one was designated to be in 
charge.  The supervisor did not conduct a pre-job brief (explaining the operational and 
safety issues involved in the job) and no one thought to walk down the job (conduct 
physical examination and discussion of the safety challenges at the work site) or plan the 
safest way to do the job.  The workers failed to follow rules requiring fall protection (e.g., 
when aloft, wear a harness attached to a fixed support) and proper use of a folding ladder 
(unfold it, don’t lean it against a wall). 
The team’s report noted that these actions and omissions may be part of a local 
culture of inappropriate risk-taking.  The tone of the task was set, in part, by the most 
senior electrical worker of the three and the only one who had changed these light bulbs 
before.  He told the others that they would “love this job ‘cause it’s kind of tight up 
there.”  Based on their interviews with Joe and others, the investigators speculated that 
this challenge struck Joe, who had just transferred to this department, as an “opportunity 
to succeed.”  Lastly, the workers ignored warning signs that the job was not routine.  
Nobody raised questions when Joe was advised to stay on the one and a half-inch steel 
framework of the building because it was the strongest part.  Joe failed to reconsider the 
job when his hand slipped through a skylight and he nearly fell, shortly before slipping 
again and falling through. 
The investigation team’s report documented lack of compliance with established 
safety practices and suggested ways to enhance compliance with existing rules.  The 
report concluded that, “The cause of the accident was a failure of the employee, the 
employee in charge, and the supervisor to properly follow the Accident Prevention 
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Manual requirements for working in elevated positions.”  The report then recommended 
that the plant should: 1) raise sensitivity to safety on routine jobs by appointing a full-
time safety person; require managers to communicate to supervisors and supervisors 
communicate to employees the plant’s expectations regarding industrial safety; and 
require department managers to provide feedback to the plant manager on each 
department’s safety issues; 2) make more detailed guidelines on working aloft available 
to employees; 3) consider instituting a company-wide program on “Working in Elevated 
Positions,” and 4) counsel all employees involved in the incident. 
Making the Transition Between Organizational Learning Stages 
The investigation illustrates the plant’s effort to shift its learning orientation from local to 
control.  The report highlights the failure of workers and first line supervisor to comply 
with existing rules and procedures.  The corrective actions’ aim to increase awareness 
and compliance with rules. Information was generated about local work practices that 
could be shared across groups, discussed openly, and used to institutionalize new work 
procedures.  The focus is on changing actions to comply with rules in order to correct a 
mismatch between desired results (keep people safe) and actual results (Joe is hurt), i.e., 
single-loop learning (Argyris & Schön, 1996).  
In a control-oriented organization, managers are judged by their lack of problems 
or the speed with which problems are resolved and control reasserted.  There is a contest 
for control between managers and engineers who are labeled as strategists and designers 
of the plant and operators and maintenance people who are labeled as implementers and 
doers (Carroll, 1998; Schein, 1996).  Challenges to that control are threatening and 
become political issues (Carroll, 1995; Tetlock, 1983).  As one member of the 
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investigation team commented, “We put together three different drafts and each time 
someone in upper management disagreed with what we wrote.  Finally the plant manager 
stepped in and accepted our answer.”  Without the opportunity to challenge underlying 
assumptions about status, careers, rules, hierarchy, and expertise and the chance to 
reshape work accordingly, employees tend to feel that “improvements” are simply 
another layer of control imposed on them (cf. employee voice, Adler & Borys, 1996).   
 
A SHIFT FROM CONTROL TO OPEN STAGE 
The second case describes an organization-wide change effort in response to a crisis that 
shut down a large nuclear power station and nearly bankrupted the utility.  It is a stark 
reminder of the importance of people in technically-dominated companies. 
The Millstone Culture Implosion 
In October 1996, the Millstone nuclear power station outside New London, Connecticut, 
received an unprecedented order from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to 
keep its plants closed until they could demonstrate a “safety conscious work 
environment.”  The problem had come to public attention earlier through a cover story in 
Time magazine about harassment and intimidation of employees who brought safety 
concerns to management.  The NRC review (Hannon et al., 1996) concluded that there 
was an unhealthy work environment, which did not tolerate dissenting views and stifled 
questioning attitudes among employees, and therefore failed to learn and change.  As the 
report said, “Every problem identified during this review had been previously identified 
to Northeast Utilities management… yet the same problems were allowed to continue.”   
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The Plant’s Interpretation 
In September 1996, the new CEO for Nuclear Power, Bruce Kenyon, set the scene for 
change by an address to all employees on his first day, in which he introduced his values: 
high standards, openness and honesty, commitment to do what was right and two-way 
communications.  He immediately revamped the Millstone top management team and 
strengthened the Employee Concerns Program.   
Kenyon’s subsequent actions enacted and modeled openness and trust.  
Throughout the next months, he met regularly with small work groups and in large all-
hands meetings to give information and encourage two-way communication:  “It shocked 
them to get candid answers.”3  Upon hearing Kenyon say publicly at his first NRC 
meeting that he found the organizations “essentially dysfunctional,” an interviewee from 
the NRC remembers thinking, “here’s a fellow who at least recognizes the problem.”  
Based on recommendations from an employee task force redesigning the Employee 
Concerns Program, Kenyon agreed to create an Employee Concerns Oversight Panel 
(ECOP) to have an independent voice and report directly to him.  ECOP was staffed with 
passionate advocates who argued with each other and with management, but over time 
they evolved a workable role.  The panel’s existence “sent a message to the work force 
that employees could act as oversight of management.”   
Kenyon allowed himself to be fallible and to enlist participation.  When two 
contractors were terminated on the grounds of poor performance and the Director of the 
Employee Concerns Program provided evidence that the terminations had been improper, 
Kenyon quickly reversed his decision.  As one of his senior managers recalls about their 
                                                           
uotations are from interviews by Carroll & Hatakenaka (2001) 
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working relationship, Kenyon “went along with all my recommendations.  He didn’t 
always agree…  [Sometimes he] swallowed hard.” 
Individual managers experienced personal transformations that changed how they 
understood the nature of the problems.  Typical of the old-style management, the 
operations vice president was weary of “whiners,” and “didn’t believe anyone would 
harass someone who brought forth safety concerns.”  When the two contractors were 
terminated and the Employee Concerns Program offered their view that the terminations 
were improper, “It was one of those moments your perception changes... a watershed for 
me.”  
Multiple mechanisms and forums allowed broad participation so that managers 
and employees could share information, develop common language, learn by doing, and 
build trust by reacting well to challenges.  We have already mentioned the Employee 
Concerns Program (ECP) that provided confidential ways to report issues for 
investigation and the Employee Concerns Oversight Panel (ECOP) that gave a direct 
connection between employee representatives and the CEO Nuclear.  The Executive 
Review Board was created after the contractor terminations to review all disciplinary 
actions, comprising senior managers and an ECOP representative as an observer.  By 
opening up the management process, it helped restore employee trust in management, and 
created an environment for managers to learn and enact new values.   The People Team, a 
coordinating group among human resources, legal department, ECP, ECOP, 
management, and organizational development consultants, met daily to respond to 
problems and organize to address issues and monitor progress.  Internal Oversight groups 
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and an independent third-party consulting group required by the NRC provided additional 
monitoring and advice.  
Making the Transition Between Organizational Learning Stages 
The NRC requirement that Millstone develop a “safety conscious work environment” and 
demonstrate this to the satisfaction of an independent third-party consultant was 
unprecedented in the industry.  The NRC offered no guidance.  Millstone had to find its 
own way to move from a control stage characterized by centralized authority and mutual 
suspicion to an open stage characterized by communication, trust, and participation.    
New senior management, external intervention, and an infusion of outside 
employees broke through managers’ defensiveness and pride in Millstone’s excellent 
prior record in the industry, built on technical excellence.  Managers’ basic assumption 
that “we know everything we need to know” was challenged (cf. Schulman, 1993).  And 
so was employees’ basic assumption that “management can’t be trusted.”  Because senior 
management reacted well to critical events such as the contractor terminations and 
independent voices were allowed to challenge the status quo, double-loop learning 
occurred.  Multiple venues emerged for managers and employees to talk together and 
work on the common problem of rebuilding Millstone.  Managers began to listen and 
trust the employees enough to act on what was being said; in turn, employees began to 
feel safer about speaking out (Edmondson, 1999) and to trust that management would 
listen and take action.  The most powerful way to regain trust is to work together with a 
common purpose (Kramer, 1999; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998).  
Managers not only became more open to information coming from employees and 
external observers, but also became aware of new kinds of information.  Millstone was 
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typical of an industry in which managers are “not high on people skills, for example, few 
can read nonverbal signals.”  Control-oriented managers, some of whom get their way by 
yelling and threatening, are generally unaware of their own emotionality and try to 
restrict any emotionality in their subordinates.  They claim to value facts and rationality, 
even when they are using fear to exercise control.  The more open environment at 
Millstone marked an increase in interpersonal skills and emotional intelligence 
(Goleman, 1995; Hirshhorn, 1993).  Through extensive new training programs and 
coaching by organizational development consultants, managers were able to “learn the 
difference between anger, hurt, and a chilling effect” and avoid confusing a fear of 
reprisal with a lack of confidence that management would take effective action. 
 
A SHIFT TO DEEP LEARNING 
At a petrochemical plant, the new plant manager initiated a plant-wide effort to use 
problem investigation teams as a way to address, simultaneously, a recent history of 
financial losses, some dangerous incidents, and repeated equipment failures.  A large-
scale intervention4 was organized by two corporate headquarters staff who had been 
promoting more strategic and systemic thinking at operational and executive levels in 
their company, using problem investigations (which they called “root cause analyses”) as 
one of several approaches.  Managers decided to expose about 20 plant employees, 
operators, maintenance staff, engineers, and first line supervisors to root cause analyses 
by dividing them into teams to explore four significant recent problems.  Each problem 
investigation team included some members from inside and some from outside the plant 
                                                           
4
 They avoid calling this “training,” which implies top-down control, and misses the larger desired impacts 
on managers and the culture in general. 
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and at least one experienced root cause facilitator (most from other plants).  The overall 
process included presentations and practice sessions on investigation techniques, 
analytical tools, and reporting methods during the course of a three-week time frame, 
culminating in reports to plant management.  The facilitation team timed each day’s 
preparation to correspond to the needs of the teams as they collected maintenance and 
operations logs, reviewed physical evidence, interviewed involved parties and 
knowledgeable experts, analyzed causes, and prepared reports. 
Charge Heater Fire 
The charge heater fire investigation examined the explosion and fire in a charge heater 
that cost $16 Million for lost production and repairs.   Charge heaters are large gas-fueled 
burners used in the transformation of waste products from oil refining back into usable 
products through hydrocracking, a dirty and dangerous process requiring very high heat 
and pressure. The residue of this process is coke (coal dust), which can accumulate on the 
inside of heater tubes.  In addition to unearthing causes of the explosion, plant managers 
also wanted to discover and ameliorate the conditions that led to this event and might 
lead to future events.  
While the causal analysis presented below may seem extremely straightforward, 
its simplicity is the result of a rigorous and laborious root cause analysis process that 
involved four elements: A time line of events that was sometimes detailed to the minute; 
an “Is/Is not” process that differentiates circumstances where the event occurred from 
similar circumstances where it did not (Kepner &Tregoe, 1981); a detailed causal event 
diagram; and a process of categorizing the quality of data used to draw inferences in the 
causal event diagram (as a verifiable fact, an inference, or a guess).  In doing these 
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analyses, members of the team argued with each other, built on each other’s ideas, and 
alternated between amazement at and appreciation for the differences in each other’s 
views of the refinery. 
The Plant’s Interpretation 
Distilling and analyzing the information available, the team concluded that the fire was 
due to a tube rupture inside the charge heater that occurred when the three quarter inch 
steel skin of the tube got too hot and tore.  The team found that three factors interacted to 
produce the fire.  First, operators ran the burners in the charge heater unevenly to increase 
heat and thereby achieve the desired higher production level, while avoiding alarms that 
would signal an unsafe condition.  Second, heat was removed more slowly than usual 
from the tube skin because coke had adhered to the inside of the tubes and was acting as 
an insulator.  There was more coke than usual because it was assumed that a new 
decoking process worked as well as the previous process and no one had checked for 
coke build up.  Third, the combination of running some tubes hotter (at a higher gas 
pressure) and the build-up of coke moved the maximum heat point up the tube.  The 
thermocouple meant to detect temperature on the tube skin, set at a height specified in the 
heater design, was now below the hottest part of the tube, so that operators believed the 
tube temperature was acceptable.  The tube ruptured above the thermocouple. 
The team noted as a “Key Learning” that plant staff made decisions without 
questioning assumptions that seemed to underlie them.   Team members were amazed at 
“how quick we jump to conclusions about things.”  First, the maintenance department 
changed decoking processes but did not know and never checked if the new process was 
effective.  Second, operators increased the burner pressure in the charge heater to 
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increase production but did not know the consequences of doing so.  Third, operators 
changed the pattern of firing heater tubes (to fire hotter around the perimeter) but again 
did not know the consequences of doing so.   They speculated that their colleagues 
probably were unaware of the assumptions they were making.  On the basis of these 
insights, the team’s first recommendation for future action was that the plant identify 
“side effects” and be more aware of the broader “decision context” when changing 
production processes. 
Based on the insights from this team and from the other teams, the plant decided 
to implement a “Management of Change Process” to address the unanticipated side 
effects and interactions that caused problems.  According to follow-up interviews with 
team members six months after their investigation, the actual results are mixed. One team 
member felt the plant Management of Change process had shown results: 
 The biggest issue that came out [of the root cause analysis intervention] was 
management of change.  MOC.  Now people pay more attention to adhering to the 
MOC process.  It may be that the RCA training helped focus attention on MOC. 
MOC is serious.  It is real.  If you don’t do it, your job is on the line.  If you do 
not do it, you have to explain why not. 
However, another team member felt, “There are no legs on the management of change 
effort.  It is just a lot of talk.” 
Making the Transition Between Organizational Learning Stages 
The charge heater investigation provides examples of an organization increasing both 
openness and deep learning.  The independent decisions that changed decoking and 
heater tube firing practices illustrate aspects of local learning. In our observations of the 
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training session, it was evident that at least some participants were anxious about being 
open with colleagues in their own department or in other departments, or with 
management.  Would operators talk to engineers?  Would an operator working on this 
investigation be perceived as having sold out?  Would managers listen to reports that 
were critical of their own behavior?  The investigation could have blamed the operators 
for “getting around” the tube temperature alarms, ignored the role of management 
decisions about production goals, and instituted more monitoring and rules.  A control 
approach to learning could have reinforced barriers to the open flow of information and 
discouraged participation, and failed to get at the underlying, systemic causes of the 
event.  
However, plant management was not approaching its problems from the 
viewpoint of control.  Instead, there was a desire to create more openness, and to 
demonstrate the value of openness and deep learning for achieving better performance.  
During the course of the training and investigation, teams experienced more openness 
and collaboration than they expected.  There was a willingness to confront reality and to 
surface underlying assumptions about “how we do work around here.”  Support from a 
new plant manager helped encourage full participation.  That support was itself an 
outcome of the training team who were working publicly with the investigation teams but 
privately meeting with management to reduce their defensiveness and enlist their visible 
engagement.  And, it was evoked and reinforced by specific features of root cause 
analysis that require close attention to factual details, data quality, and cause-effect 
relationships. 
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The team investigation began to create deep learning when they started addressing 
operations at the plant from a systemic perspective and challenging assumptions. 
Paradoxically, the process of “drilling down” precisely and narrowly into causes of this 
incident allowed the team to develop new awareness of interdependencies across the 
system.  In our interviews with team members, they universally highlighted the benefit of 
having a diverse team because of the surprising differences among people’s ways of 
looking at the same problem.  They recognized interactions among components of the 
system and began to understand a central tenet of the quality movement (e.g. Goldratt & 
Cox, 1992) that working to optimize individual components does not automatically add 
up to an optimized system.  Most importantly, they developed and practiced double-loop 
learning capabilities to recognize assumptions and mental models as separate from reality 
(Friedman & Lipshitz, 1992) and take action with new mental models (Argyris, et al., 
1985).  
 
INSIGHTS ABOUT ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
A Framework for the Stages 
The four organizational learning stages can be thought of as a progression, but the stages 
can also be examined for underlying dimensions and symmetries.  In Figure 2, we 
organize the four stages into a 2 X 2 table5 representing two dimensions: (1) single- and 
double-loop learning and (2) improvising and structuring.  As we have discussed earlier 
in this paper, single-loop learning adjusts goal-oriented actions based on feedback to 
better achieve the same goal (Argyris, et al., 1985).  In double-loop learning, a deeper 
                                                           
5
  Because there were four stages, we wondered whether they could be placed into a 2X2 table.  The 
dimensions of the table were induced from the case studies and should be treated as provisional. 
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inquiry surfaces and challenges underlying assumptions and values regarding the 
selection of that goal.  Improvising is a process of acting intuitively into an emerging 
situation rather than following structured procedures or plans (Weick, 1998).  Structuring 
is about consistency and predictability embodied in routines and shared mental models.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 
--------------------------------- 
The above analysis offers several important insights.  First, it emphasizes the 
importance of the two dimensions.  The large, technologically-driven organizations that 
we have studied do not appear to transform all these elements at once or even to change 
them gradually.  Instead, there is a natural order to their focus.  Local learning is single-
loop and improvised, emerging from work practices and life experiences.  Control is 
exercised by adding structure but it remains single-loop because underlying assumptions 
are rarely considered or changed.  Open learning is double-loop and improvised, as 
individuals awaken to the limitations of the organization and challenge assumptions 
about separate domains of technical expertise, compliance with rules, hierarchy, and so 
forth.  Deep learning is double-loop and adds structure as new tools for inquiry and 
collaboration spread through the organization. 
Second, progress through the stages zigzags through the dimensions.  In 
particular, the transition from controlled to open involves changing both dimensions, 
moving from structured single-loop learning to improvised double-loop learning.  
Perhaps this is a reason why the transition is so difficult and organizations seem to get 
stuck in the control stage. Control through measurement, monitoring, incentives, and 
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other traditional bureaucratic mechanisms seems to come naturally to managers and 
engineers (Carroll, 1998; Schein, 1996).  Companies adopt programs such as TQM and 
learning organization more to copy success stories and achieve legitimacy rather than 
through commitment and understanding (Cole, 1998; Repenning & Sterman, 2000).   
The most advanced of the companies we have studied are only beginning to 
recognize the limitations of top-down control and promote open exchange of information, 
motivated by a few subversive visionaries and the intense pressures of competition and 
regulation.  The “questioning attitude” and “safety culture” advocated in these industries 
are directed at acknowledging doubt (Schulman, 1993), increasing awareness or 
mindfulness (Weick et al., 1999), creating psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999), 
respecting the contributions of others, and placing a positive value on teamwork and 
learning.  Such trust can only be developed by observations of the experience of 
courageous pioneers who take early risks to tell the truth.  When others validate open 
behavior, trust is built and openness spreads in a virtuous cycle. 
Openness to learning becomes linked to a discipline for learning in the transition 
to what we call the deep learning stage.  The complexity and pace of change of modern 
organizations requires more than a desire to learn.  Special circumstances for learning and 
concepts and techniques that make learning more efficient are needed to break through 
long-held assumptions and cognitive habits.  Deep learning is not simply the use of 
particular techniques such as root cause analysis. There are many versions of “root cause 
analysis,” most of which are used with minimal training to find and fix problems (Carroll, 
1995) rather than to challenge deep assumptions with rigorous and systemic thinking, just 
as TQM can be used for control rather than learning (Sitkin et al., 1994).  It is not 
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particular tools such as root cause analysis that lead to learning, but rethinking actions 
and assumptions in the context of new concepts that underlie the tools, such as data 
quality, rigorous cause-effect connections, systems thinking, mutual respect across 
groups, insight into personal and political relationships, and double-loop learning.  The 
tools and the learning activities are only an opportunity to have new conversations, enact 
new behaviors, develop new skills, and build new relationships. 
Learning-in-Action 
The cases reinforce the importance of learning through action.  Although some kinds of 
knowledge are represented explicitly (numbers, words) and easy to store and transfer, 
many kinds of knowledge have to be reconstructed by users, improvised, tried out and 
modified to suit the occasion.  In the Fall From Roof case, team members learned through 
their investigation process and interaction with management, and the organization learned 
from its failure (the accident) and by enacting the corrective action process.  The 
Millstone case offers the clearest example of policy and culture change requiring an 
interative process of trying out new behaviors, then adjusting behaviors and mental 
models to the reactions of participants and the emerging definitions of success.  The 
Charge Heater Fire investigation appears on the surface to be the introduction of new 
investigation and analysis techniques, but upon deeper reflection it represents a 
negotiated interaction among managers and workers, and among multiple worker groups, 
to achieve a new relationship of openness and collaborative engagement.  
Experience with learning cycles increased tolerance for short-term difficulties and 
occasioned resource shifts away from production toward learning.  A systemic view 
suggests that things get worse before they get better (since resources are shifted away 
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from immediate needs) and that leverage points must be identified for selective 
investment.  Problems are not simply someone’s fault, but rather a feature of the system; 
altering that system takes deep understanding and broad support.  This is more than 
“controlling” people.  System principles may be hard to verbalize yet possible to learn 
through action or instruction.  For example, a rigid grip of a rowing oar may increase the 
feeling of control but decrease absorption of the shock of uneven waters, thereby 
decreasing actual control.  Managers may use “heavyhanded” incentives and authority to 
increase their feeling of control and drive noncompliance out of sight, simultaneously 
increasing the discrepancy between rules and actual behavior. 
In summary, we have argued for the importance and difficulty of learning from 
experience, particularly when meaning must emerge from local bits and pieces and the 
enactment of new practices in complex and rapidly changing environments.  The history 
of these industries and the case studies we have examined suggest that there is a common 
progression from local learning to a control orientation associated with single-loop 
learning, which is then held in place by managerial and professional culture.  Yet 
problems continue to occur and many organizations seek to be more proactive by 
becoming a learning organization, which incorporates mutually-reinforcing elements of 
attitudes and thinking patterns.  Our results suggest that, to some degree at least, attitudes 
favorable to learning precede double-loop learning skills.  The concepts and skills of deep 
learning seem to be difficult to master and to require significant commitment, discipline, 
and learning-in-action.  Future research will undoubtedly put more flesh on the bones of 
this framework, and contribute alternative ways to think about organizational learning. 
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